Introduction
As soon as they recovered themselves a little they walked toward Lisbon. They had some money left, with which they hoped to save themselves from starving, after they had escaped drowning. Scarcely had they reached the city, lamenting the death of their benefactor, when they felt the earth tremble under their feet. The sea swelled and foamed in the harbour, and beat to pieces the vessels riding at anchor. Whirlwinds of fire and ashes covered the streets and public places; houses fell, roofs were flung upon the pavements, and the pavements were scattered. Thirty thousand inhabitants of all ages and sexes were crushed under the ruins. The sailor, whistling and swearing, said there was booty to be gained here.
"What can be the sufficient reason of this phenomenon?" said Pangloss.
"This is the Last Day!" cried Candide.
The sailor ran among the ruins, facing death to find money; finding it, he took it, got drunk, and having slept himself sober, purchased the favours of the first good-natured wench whom he met on the ruins of the destroyed houses, and in the midst of the dying and the dead. Pangloss pulled him by the sleeve.
"My friend," said he, "this is not right. You sin against the universal reason; you choose your time badly." (Voltaire [1759 (Voltaire [ ] 1918 In his poem of 1756 on the Lisbon earthquake and in the paradigmatic novel Candide three years later, Voltaire used the earthquake as an opportunity to argue against the optimism of the mid-18 th century. In polemic terms he argued against the idea that, despite such a dreadful disaster, we still live in the best of all possible worlds, and claimed that no meaning could possibly lie behind such a catastrophe. At the same time, he also argued against an opposite position, what the historian Kevin Rozario has termed a pessimistic cosmic fatalism, the widespread idea of calamities as the rightful divine punishment of sinful man (Rozario, 2007:15) . The Lisbon earthquake and Voltaire's polemic writings on the disaster are often referred to as a turning point in the western thought.
It changed the way of thinking about disasters, nature, evil and morals (e.g. Löffler, 1999) . In her now classic book Evil in Western Thought, the philosopher Susan Neiman writes: "Since Lisbon, natural evils no longer have any seemingly relation to moral evils; hence they no longer have meaning at all. Natural disaster is the object of attempts at prediction and control, not of interpretation" (Neiman, 2002:250) . If this is the case, it is tempting to ask a rather naïve and simple question; if natural disasters really are fundamentally meaningless, how do we then make them understandable?
The ways Candide, his preceptor Pangloss, and the sailor respond to the Lisbon earthquake in the opening quote seem surprisingly familiar to us today. Pangloss' call for a sufficient reason is referring to Leibniz and his concept of theodicy. We still call to have universal reasons behind disasters explained, though not in the same terms as Pangloss. Candide and the sailor's responses seem even more familiar, and are echoed in late modern disaster discourse. We still fear an apocalypse either in secular or religious terms and we too associate disaster areas with an uncontrollable state of looting and violence.
The literature scholar Isak Winkel Holm claims that modern disaster discourse, or what he, with a reference to the philosopher Charles Taylor, terms the social imaginary of disasters, is structured according to a number of symbolic forms (Holm, 2012a; Holm, 2012b:21) . He even claims that since the Lisbon earthquake, this cultural repertoire "of images structuring the cultural imagination of disaster in the Western world has, in fact, been surprisingly small and surprisingly stable" (Holm, 2012b:24) . Following up on this claim, I will point out the very limited number of symbolic forms or cultural models of morals and disasters that appear when natural disasters are being mass mediated in a late modern world. To be more precise, the paper will discuss the ways relationships or non-relationships between disasters, nature, morals and evils were articulated in Norwegian media representations of Hurricane Katrina.
Writing nature from a folklore studies perspective involves a history of ideas written from below. Folklore studies is a discipline examining how cultural understandings, ideas and evaluations are distributed and negotiated through vernacular and popular cultural expressions, with an emphasis on culturally distributed narratives. Hence, the practice of writing nature in folklore studies may just as well be described as a practice of reading nature. Such reading of nature could, within folklore studies, be undertaken from a number of theoretical positions. My contribution has some connections to actor-network theory. It is often emphasized that the key term in actor-network theory, actant, is taken from the semiotics of Algirdas Julien Greimas. What is less known is that Greimas based his concept on the formalist Vladimir Propp's study of the morphology of folktales (Holbek, 1987:349-354) . What Greimas describes as an actant, is in Propp's narratology called a sphere of action. In a sphere of action, the narrative character -the dramatis personae -and the narratological function of the character are amalgamated into one narratological unit (Propp, 1968:79) .
As an approach to a narratological reading of nature, I will focus on the spheres of action of natural forces and mankind in Norwegian media representations of Hurricane Katrina. Hence, in this narrative and rhetorical analysis, vernacular concepts of nature, social structure and human behavior represents the starting points for discussing how certain cultural models of morals and evil are articulated in the Norwegian media response to Hurricane Katrina.
Mediating Hurricane Katrina
Mass media is an arena for public sense making, and brings distant events to local audiences. Media audiences today are able to follow extreme and spectacular events around the world, such as natural disasters, in real time. Hence, media-made spectator aesthetics and well-structured narrative scripts have become crucial for how we perceive and understand disaster (Ekström, 2013:473) . As such, global media networks put disasters on display by drawing on prefigured imaginations of disaster scenes. This became obvious when Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, and became a global media event. and the absence of the authorities. They argue that these motifs followed a well-established script of disaster narratives. These narratives were displayed almost before the catastrophe became reality (Dynes and Rodríguez, 2007) . These motifs framed the disaster as a globally exposed, vivid TV drama. The European and the Norwegian media representations of the disaster were structured around topics and narrative motifs similar to those on American TV. Hence, the media coverage first and foremost illustrated how globally integrated the media world is.
Western disaster discourse has been claimed to be heavily influenced by Hollywood movies and popular culture (Tierney et al., 2006; Webb, 2007; Žižek, 2005) . However, it is certainly not only popular culture that structures how we imagine and represent disasters. Late modern disaster discourse has deep historical roots (Holm, 2012a:65) . The Norwegian media coverage of Hurricane Katrina was, roughly speaking, structured after four main topics.
One of them was the increase of petroleum prices, due to reduced oil production in the Mexican Gulf and heavily damaged oil refineries in the Gulf region. Several newspaper articles and national broadcast news reports discussed the impact the hurricane had on the Norwegian economy. Such kind of news illustrates how calamities and expectations of ruin and renewal are integrated in capitalism as a premise for economic development (Rozario, 2007) .
They illustrate how one man's profit is another's loss. However, such kinds of news first and foremost tell how the global economy works, and put little direct emphasis on either the disaster, or the disaster area. I will therefore leave this topic out of my further discussions, and concentrate on the three remaining topics, which I have called: "The collapse of civil society", "Social vulnerability"
and "Extreme weather and global warming". These topics are all, in one way or another, dealing with relations between disasters, morals and evil. They are all handling the shocking news in ways that make it possible to cope with the meaninglessness of the disaster, in the sense that they place it into structures that make them morally and intellectually explainable for the media audience.
The collapse of civil society
On September 2, 2005, four days after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the tabloid Dagbladet could report that a state of lawlessness and helplessness dominated the flooded city of New Orleans.
An article simply titled "Lawless and helpless" described a chaotic, dangerous and desperate situation where: "Criminals and desperate armed survivors are making the rescue work life-threatening, and the police lack resources" (Dagbladet, September 2 2005:12) . The disaster scholar Kathleen Tierney has remarked that stories about looting are not only frequently told and broadcast. Disaster narratives also frame how we handle disasters. Tierney and her colleagues has pointed out that such stories suddenly turned the often used metaphor for describing disaster areas -a war zoneinto reality when 69 000 troops from the National Guard arrived New Orleans (Tierney et al., 2006) . The governor of Louisiana, Kathleen Blanco, announced the appearance of these troops with a warning: "I have one message for these hoodlums: These troops know how to shoot and kill, and they are more than willing to do so if necessary, and I expect they will" (CNN, September 2, is likely to assume that the re-telling and re-contextualization of looting narratives from a local American context to a Norwegian media context to some extent reflects that the cultural imaginations these stories are based on also found resonance among a
Norwegian media audience.
The article from Dagbladet, along with a number of similar news reports, reveals a certain kind of disaster imagination. In the Norwegian press, the lawlessness and helplessness of the people in New Orleans was explained partly in light of American social structures and partly due to fundamental human behavior uncovered when civilization was literally swept away. Hence, the true disaster was not the hurricane; it was rather the lawless and chaotic situation that apparently appeared in its aftermath. The hurricane was just a necessary background for the story. The storm prepared the scene for the incomprehensible actions of the looting antagonists. Nature, understood as the meteorological forces, had no active part in the drama and was thus not ascribed any explanatory value. Instead the stories about looting framed the disaster as a fundamental human-moral situation. The writer Rebecca Solnit, has pointed out that this kind of framing of disasters draws on an idea best formulated in Thomas Hobbes' concept of the state of nature, as a war of all against all (Solnit, 2009:91; 241-242) . My point is that this kind of narrative framing, so to speak, converts the catastrophe from a natural to a moral disaster, caused by the true nature of mankind.
Social vulnerability
An article in the regional newspaper Adresseavisen from December The war metaphor was again repeated, but why was it put in connection to the third world? What was it with the pictures from New Orleans that made such an analogy possible?
This analogy reflects an idea about the interrelationship between development and vulnerability, and is based on an idea of a divide between natural hazards and disasters. This distinction is well established in both disaster studies and popular disaster discourse.
Over the last 30 years it has been emphasized that it is social vulnerability that makes it possible for hazards to turn into disasters (Hewitt, 1997) . This is by now a well-documented empirical fact. Nevertheless, this way of understanding disasters also has a discursive dimension. The concept of vulnerability implies an idea about the opposite -invulnerability, often referred to as resilience.
While countries in the third world are generally considered to be more or less vulnerable to natural hazards, the western countries, on the other hand, are presumed to be more or less invulnerable.
Vulnerability and development are in other words two sides of the same coin.
Hurricane Katrina exposed the vulnerability of American society to the world. It was a tremendous shock when the USA was unable to handle the situation. In an editorial article, the social democratic The critique of the disaster management in the aftermath of the hurricane was highly politicized both in the USA and abroad. In quite direct terms it was directed against the Bush-administration, and in the USA also against FEMA (The Federal Emergency Management Agency). However, on a more fundamental level such kind of critical reports was about more than the stupidity of the Bush-administration. While narratives on looting thematize the collapse of social structures, reports on social vulnerability represent the opposite. They are all about social structures -political and institutional structures one would expect to be working but didn't, and the structures that were working all too well -in this case, the armed forces.
In American public debates, Hurricane Katrina was characterized as an unnatural disaster (Lee, 2006; Reed, 2006; Hartman and Squires, 2006) . The term unnatural was not used in the Norwegian press. Yet, both the news reports and the commentary referred to in this article were still in line with such an understanding of the disaster in the sense that nature was completely written out of this kind of analysis, in favor of structural and political explanations.
An impression was given that modern, developed societies were expected to be natureproof, so to speak. Extreme weather and global warming -when nature strikes back
In the USA as well as in Europe, Hurricane Katrina was almost immediately linked to global warming, (Mooney, 2007:150; Boykoff, 2011:136) . The profiled American environmentalist Bill McKibben called it "the first of many global warming disasters destined to strike in the twenty-first century" (quoted in Hertsgaard, 2006:19) .
In The first paragraph of the quote is seemingly drawing on established climate research, but as the argument evolves, another kind of reasoning emerges. The climate research referred to in the first paragraph is based upon complex probability calculation with a long range of uncertainties, while the journalistic and popular climate discourse that soon brakes its way through the textual surface argues for simple and direct causality with global warming as the cause and singular weather disasters as the consequence (Kverndokk, 2011:171-174 (Kjørup, 2002) .
2010:64-67). Such signs in nature were, argumentatively speaking, empty examples, in the sense that the interpretation of them was not fixed, but depended upon the argumentative framing (Nicolaysen, 1999:131) . A similar sign-reading practice can be traced in the editorial article from Dagbladet. The text establishes connections between phenomena of different kinds, appearing at totally different geographical locations by the use of the term extreme weather. By the use of this term they are transformed into being incidents of the same kind, working argumentatively-speaking as similar types of signs predicting a dark future.
Modernity is often described as the emergence of an ontological divide between nature and culture and between nature and morals (Latour, 1993; Neiman, 2002:250) 
Conclusion: Disasters, morals and nature
The relationship between nature, morals and evil are set out rather differently in the three models sketched. Nature is written in and out of these models of disasters, morals and evil. These models are, however, not mutually exclusive. The differences between them are rather a question of scale. The Hobbesian model works on a cultural and local level, the banality of evil model works on a national, political level, while the 'nature strikes back' model operates on a global political level. The analysis in this paper further shows that the notion of (natural) disaster is not fixed in late modern disaster discourse. Its different conceptual levels make it complex, flexible, and interpretative. It is quite clear that a disaster is an object of continual interpretation and cultural negotiation and not merely "the object of attempts at prediction and control" (Neiman, 2002:250) .
This paper has examined how rather different sorts of well-estab- 
